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Abstract 
This article assesses South African Broadcasting Corporation v 
Democratic Alliance 2016 2 SA 522 (SCA) and Economic 
Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 3 
SA 580 (CC) and to a lesser extent the state of capture 
judgments. All of these deal with whether the findings and 
remedial action of the Public Protector (PP) are binding in 
certain circumstances. The judgments significantly change the 
impact and effect of findings made by the Office of the Public 
Protector (OPP) and have important consequences and lessons 
for other Chapter 9 institutions. It is apparent from these 
judgments that there was a concerted attempt to undermine the 
OPP by systematically disrespecting and not implementing the 
remedial action. It is argued in the article that egregious 
violations by public officials contributed to the courts' rulings that 
the findings of the PP may be binding. The article also explicitly 
records the unlawful conduct of public officials and the resultant 
cost and consequence in the hope that conduct of this nature is 
not repeated. It also specifically notes that the major findings in 
the Nkandla, SABC and State of Capture reports have withstood 
judicial scrutiny. Regrettably, this exalted standard has not 
always been replicated in the reports of the present PP. Finally, 
the article submits, on the basis of these judgments that the 
findings of the South African Human Rights Commission should 
in certain circumstances be binding. 
Keywords 
Public Protector; findings and remedial action; state capture; 
Chapter 9 institutions; South African Human Rights Commission 
………………………………………………………. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In October 2015 the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) handed down a 
judgment in South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance 
("SABC v DA case")1 dealing with the nature and scope of the powers of the 
Public Protector (PP). The case is significant in that it attempts to provide 
clarity regarding the exercise of such powers, and the judgment was cited 
with approval by the Constitutional Court when determining the force and 
effect of the PP's findings in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the 
National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National 
Assembly2 ("EFF case"). Most recently, the full bench of the Pretoria High 
Court in President of the Republic of South Africa v Office of the Public 
Protector3 ("State Capture case") applied the EFF case and ruled that the 
President is bound by the PP's instruction to appoint a commission of inquiry 
into "state capture". 
These judgments redefined the consequences and effect of findings made 
by the Office of the Public Protector (OPP) and significantly reconfigured 
the relationship between the OPP and other organs of state. In these cases 
the judiciary had to determine the effect to be given to the reports and 
findings of the OPP in a context of cynical and blatant disregard of the rule 
of law by those exercising public power. It appears that an election was 
made to shore up the powers of the OPP to deal with patent and blatant 
unlawful action. Now that the OPP has the capacity to make binding 
decisions, affected organs of state must either comply or take these 
decisions on review. Political manoeuvring and nimble prevarications are 
no longer options. This clarification has important consequences for the 
OPP. Given the binding nature of some of the findings, the OPP's 
conclusions on the merits and the remedies it prescribes are more likely to 
be challenged than was the case in the past. It is thus vital that the OPP, in 
order to ensure that its legitimacy and credibility as a leading Chapter 9 
institution are maintained, must reach procedurally and substantively 
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correct decisions, as the previous PP did in the face of unconstitutional and 
vituperative attacks from parts of the executive, the legislature, and some 
members of the ANC. The best bulwark against repeated challenges in the 
courts will be coherent, logical, and defendable reasoning underpinning the 
conclusions reached by the OPP. 
 
The objective of the OPP, as the SCA had occasion to remind one of the 
previous PPs, Advocate Lawrence Mushwana, is to function as the last 
defence against bureaucratic oppression, corruption and malfeasance.4 
This Court trenchantly criticised his reasoning in The Public Protector case 
and cautioned:5 
… if that institution falters, or finds itself undermined, the nation loses an 
indispensable constitutional guarantee. 
 
Both the improper payment and the improper receipt of public money 
constituted an unlawful act, something that Mushwana failed to recognise.6 
The SCA reminded the OPP that the office is both independent and 
impartial, and these words mean what they say, and "fulfilling their demands 
will call for courage at times".7 
A number of leading scholars were critical of Mushwana as the PP and were 
against his subsequent appointment as chairperson of the South African 
Human Rights Commission ("SAHRC").8 During his tenure as PP, he was 
labelled as the "ANC Protector" as a consequence of the large number of 
ANC members being cleared of wrongdoing by the OPP.9 It is apparent that 
Advocate Mushwana's successor, Advocate Thuli Madonsela, took the 
sentiments of the SCA in the Public Protector case to heart and it is equally 
apparent that the state institutions central to the cases discussed in this 
article palpably failed to do so. Decided cases teach important lessons and 
a failure to heed these often results in public power being exercised 
unconstitutionally, and, in some instances, recklessly. Unfortunately for the 
present incumbent, the court in ABSA Bank Limited v Public Protector10 
(ABSA Bank case") found that basic errors were made in the report and in 
 
 
 
 
4 The Public Protector v Mail and Guardian Ltd 2011 4 SA 420 (SCA) para 101 
(hereafter the Public Protector case). 
5 Public Protector case para 6. 
6 Govender 2013 AHRLJ 99. 
7 Public Protector case para 8. 
8 Thipanyane 2015/2016 NY L Sch L Rev 140. 
9 Hoexter Administrative Law 91. 
10 2018 2 All SA 1 (GP). 
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respect of the remedial action required to be taken.11 The court held that the 
OPP, in requiring the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to re-open the 
investigation and recover misappropriated public funds from ABSA, acted 
inconsistently with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 ("the Constitution") and the Public Protector Act. Specifically, 
the court held that the PP exceeded the powers entrusted to her by the 
Constitution and the Public Protector Act, and held further that the remedial 
measures were ultra vires the provisions of the Special Investigation Units 
and Special Tribunals Act.12 Furthermore, the court in ABSA held that the 
remedial measures of the OPP could also be reviewed and set aside on the 
basis that it had been proven that the OPP was reasonably suspected of 
bias, as provided for in section 6(2)(a)(iii) of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act.13 This finding is particularly worrying as the OPP, as a central 
tenet, is required to be independent and subject only to the Constitution and 
the law. After the embarrassing exhortation by the courts to the OPP in the 
Public Protector case14 to be courageous, there was the re-emergence of 
an effective, independent and respected institution ⎯ particularly after the 
bruising battles with members of the executive as detailed in the cases 
considered in this note. The finding of a reasonable suspicion of bias in the 
ABSA case, however, is worrying from a broader societal perspective. The 
efficacy and independence of the OPP cannot be dependent on the identity 
of the incumbent of the office. The best way to avoid this is for the 
constitutional and legal imperatives that regulate the functioning of the office 
to be internalised, and for these to inform all decisions that are taken. The 
simple question that needs to be answered is whether the decision taken is 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and empowering 
legislation, as interpreted by the courts. 
The OPP took the decision in the ABSA Bank case on appeal to the 
Constitutional Court. In Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank,15 
the Court had to decide two main issues. First, the court had to decide 
whether it should interfere with the decision of the Full Bench of the Gauteng 
North High Court to award punitive costs in favour of the South African 
Reserve Bank (Reserve Bank) against the PP, Advocate Busisiwe 
Mkhwebane, in her personal capacity. Second, the court had to decide 
 
11 The Court took the unusual step of ordering the OPP to pay 85 per cent in its official 
capacity and directed Advocate Busisiwe Mkhwebane to pay 15 per cent of the costs 
in her personal capacity. 
12 74 of 1996. 
13 ABSA Bank case para 101; Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
14 Public Protector case para 8. 
15 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC). 
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whether the Reserve Bank was entitled to a declaratory order to the effect 
that the PP abused her office in conducting the investigation that gave rise 
to her impugned report. 
 
Writing for the majority, Khampepe and Theron JJ (Cameron, Froneman 
and Mhlantla JJ, Basson, Dlodlo and Petse AJJ concurring) held that 
granting a personal costs order in a case where it has application will not 
open the floodgates for further personal costs orders, because the question 
of whether a personal costs order should be granted must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. The only material question was whether the High 
Court misdirected itself in concluding that the PP did not act in good faith, 
and "behaved in an unacceptable and secretive manner".16 The majority 
emphasised that regard must be had to the higher standard of conduct 
expected from public officials as well as the number of falsehoods that have 
been put forward by the PP. This conduct included the numerous 
"misstatements", like misrepresenting, under oath, her reliance on the 
evidence of economic experts. As a consequence, they upheld the punitive 
aspect of the costs order.17 Certain crucial findings were made by the 
majority. The PP relied on section 5(3) of the Public Protector Act,18 which 
indemnified the office of the PP for any report, finding, point of view or 
recommendation made or expressed in good faith. The majority found that 
the immunity applied only if the PP acts in good faith. Therefore, if the PP 
acted in bad faith section 5(3) would be of no assistance to her. The majority 
found that according to the High Court, the PP acted in bad faith. It further 
held that there was no reason to interfere with this finding.19 There is thus 
an undisturbed finding by the highest court in the land that the PP acted in 
bad faith. 
A further finding made by the High Court was that the PP was reasonably 
suspected of bias. The PP attacked this finding on the basis that the High 
Court incorrectly conflated the review grounds of procedural fairness and 
bias. The majority affirmed that procedural fairness and bias are 
independent grounds of review under PAJA. It went on to hold that the High 
Court correctly stated that the conduct of a public official who conducts 
herself in a procedurally unfair manner may be evidence of a reasonable 
suspicion of bias. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that the PP was 
reasonably suspected of bias remained undisturbed.20 The majority rejected 
 
16 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) para 160. 
17 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) para 237. 
18 Public Protector Act 23 of 1994. 
19 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) paras 161-162. 
20 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) paras 168-170. 
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the PP's claim that there were innocent errors on her part. The court found 
that this was not a credible explanation.21 
The conduct of the PP, as found by the majority, appears to be wholly 
incompatible with the constitutional imperative in section 181(2) of the 
Constitution. This provision provides that the OPP must be independent, 
subject only to the Constitution and the law, must be impartial, and must 
exercise its powers and perform its functions without fear, favour or 
prejudice. Acting in bad faith or in a manner that could give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of bias is the very antithesis of the constitutional 
obligations contained in section 181(2). 
 
In a lengthy minority judgment, Mogoeng CJ (Goliath AJ concurring) placed 
great emphasis on the importance of the state's capacity to investigate and 
expose unethical conduct. For centuries preceding our constitutional 
democracy, untouchability was so entrenched that it was unthinkable for 
anyone to challenge various forms of criminality. Mogoeng CJ pointed out 
that it was during that era that the Reserve Bank entered into a lifeboat 
agreement with Bankorp. He also highlighted the need to guard against 
making personal costs against state functionaries acting in their official 
capacities fashionable, which he felt was likely to have a negative effect on 
their willingness to confront perceived or alleged wrongdoing.22 The 
minority found that the High Court's order for personal costs on an attorney 
and client scale made against the PP had a potentially weakening effect 
on that office and all other high state offices.23  Mogoeng CJ found that the 
PP had not acted in bad faith and neither had she acted in a grossly 
negligent fashion.24 However, Mogoeng CJ found that the PP "got the law 
completely wrong by acting as if it was open to her to direct parliament to 
amend the Constitution …".25 Furthermore, Mogoeng CJ found that the PP 
failed to answer some of the criticism made against her report. According to 
Mogoeng CJ, she "fumbled around in a way that is somewhat 
concerning".26 Despite these reservations, Mogoeng CJ set aside the order 
for personal costs on an attorney and client scale and replaced it with a 
party and party costs order against the PP, in her official capacity.27 
 
No doubt some of these scathing findings, particularly those in the majority 
 
21 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) para 205. 
22 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) paras 2-6. 
23 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) para 128. 
24 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) paras 102-106. 
25 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) para 64. 
26 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) para 81. 
27 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 6 SA 253 (CC) para 119. 
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judgment, will feature prominently in any future inquiry or hearing held into 
the fitness of the PP to hold office. 
Very early on in the First Certification case28 the Constitutional Court held 
that as the OPP investigates sensitive and potentially embarrassing affairs 
of government, safeguarding its independence and impartiality was vital to 
"ensuring effective, accountable and responsible government".29 The SABC 
in the cases involving Hlaudi Motsoeneng and the members of the executive 
and legislature in the cases dealing with the unauthorised and excessive 
expenditure incurred in upgrading the Nkandla residence of former 
President Zuma acted in a manner that undermined a vital and 
indispensable constitutional guarantee. According to section 181(3) of the 
Constitution these organs of state are obliged to assist and protect the OPP 
to ensure its independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness. There 
was a marked dissonance, however, between what they were obliged to do 
and professed to be doing on the one hand, and what they were in effect 
doing on the other hand. The cases considered in this article reveal the 
extent to which organs of state pursuing unconstitutional objectives were 
prepared to go, even though their courses of action seriously undermined 
the OPP. The various courts were faced with the conundrum of allowing this 
gradual undermining of this institution through various stratagems by non- 
compliance with the findings made. Alternatively, the courts had to clarify 
the consequence and effect of the orders to ensure that non-compliance at 
the discretion of those adversely affected by the decisions was no longer an 
option. In the light of the importance of the OPP to the constitutional project, 
the behaviour of the public officials involved, and the egregious impact that 
it had on the rule of law, it is no surprise that the courts held that the remedial 
action decided on by the OPP may be binding. This has also had major 
implications for the OPP and other Chapter 9 institutions such as the 
SAHRC. The SABC cases are discussed and analysed first. 
 
2 South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic 
Alliance30 
In order to fully appreciate the reasons for the findings and remedial action 
required by the PP, it is necessary to deal comprehensively with the facts 
and conclusions reached by her. In SABC v DA the SCA considered the 
 
28 Certification of the Constitution of the RSA 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) (hereafter the 
Certification case). 
29 Certification case para 164. 
30 South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance 2016 2 SA 522 (SCA) 
(hereafter SABC v DA). 
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impact and effect of the findings and remedial action made by the OPP. On 
17 February 2014 the OPP produced a report entitled "A Report on an 
Investigation into Allegations of Maladministration, Systemic Corporate 
Governance Deficiencies, Abuse of Power and the Irregular Appointment of 
Mr Hlaudi Motsoeneng by the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC)". The findings of that report were rejected by the SABC, the Minister 
of Communications and Mr Motsoeneng, the Acting Chief Operations 
Officer of the SABC (Acting COO) at the time. They subsequently adopted 
a strategy of stringing out and frustrating the court process for over two 
years in a desperate attempt to allow Mr Motsoeneng to keep his job. Given 
the parlous state of the SABC and its virtual bankruptcy, which had resulted 
from Mr Motsoeneng's actions, the pertinent question of why such a 
concerted effort was made to protect Mr Motsoeneng still remains 
unanswered. 
 
The matter was heard in three courts and it is apparent from the judgments 
that Mr Motsoeneng's defences were without merit. The first case was heard 
before Schippers J in the Western Cape High Court and was successfully 
brought by the Democratic Alliance (DA). This decision was taken on appeal 
to the SCA by the SABC, the Minister of Communications and Mr 
Motsoeneng. Again, the DA was successful. Following this defeat, a related 
matter was heard in the Western Cape High Court before Davis J, who ruled 
in favour of the DA. Davis J refused leave to appeal his judgment setting 
aside Mr Motsoeneng's permanent appointment as COO in May 2016. 
Following this ruling, Mr Motsoeneng unsuccessfully filed a petition to the 
SCA in July 2016, seeking leave to appeal the judgment.31 
The litigation arose from the failure of the SABC and the Minister of 
Communications to implement the recommendations of the PP in respect of 
Mr Motsoeneng.32 Between November 2011 and February 2012 the OPP 
received several complaints from former employees of the SABC. These 
related to the irregular appointment of Mr Motsoeneng as the Acting COO, 
as well as various complaints of maladministration against him relating to 
human resources, financial management and governance failure. A further 
complaint was made in relation to irregular interference in the affairs of the 
SABC by the then Minister of Communications, Ms Dina Pule. Following an 
investigation, the PP released her report in February 2014.33 
 
 
31 Selfe 2018 http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/motsoenengs-sca-petition-a-waste- 
of-time-for-which. 
32 SABC v DA para 4. 
33 PP When Governance and Ethics Fail para 5. 
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The PP found there were "pathological corporate governance deficiencies 
at the SABC".34 She found the following to be unlawful: in respect of Mr 
Motsoeneng, she found that his appointment as Acting COO was irregular; 
the former chairperson of the SABC, Dr Ben Ngubane, had acted irregularly 
by ordering that the qualification requirements for appointment to the 
position of COO be altered to suit Mr Motsoeneng's circumstances, and Mr 
Motsoeneng's salary progression from R1, 500, 000 to R2, 400, 000 in a 
single fiscal year was irregular. The PP held that he had abused his power 
and position to unduly benefit himself; he had fraudulently misrepresented 
that he had matriculated; he had been appointed to certain posts at the 
SABC despite not possessing the appropriate qualifications for those posts; 
and he was responsible, as part of the SABC management, for the irregular 
appointment of the SABC's Chief Financial Officer. The PP further held that 
he was involved in the irregular termination of employment of several senior 
staff members, and he had irregularly increased the salaries of certain staff 
members, which resulted in a salary bill increase of R29, 000, 000.35 
The PP further found that the Department of Communications and Minister 
Dina Pule, with the assistance of Mr Motsoeneng, had unduly interfered in 
the affairs of the SABC.36 The PP directed the SABC Board to ensure that 
monies that were irregularly spent were recovered, that appropriate 
disciplinary action be taken against Mr Motsoeneng, and that wasteful 
expenditure incurred as a result of irregular salary increments to Mr 
Motsoeneng be recovered from him. The Minister and the SABC Board 
were each required to submit an implementation plan within 30 days, 
indicating how remedial action would be implemented. All actions in terms 
of those plans were to be completed within six months.37 It is material that 
the PP not only directed that remedial action be taken, but also insisted on 
an implementation plan being devised and implemented within firm time 
lines. This was obviously prompted by the nature and scale of the 
maladministration. 
Despite the damning findings of widespread unlawful conduct and 
dishonesty made by the OPP, the SABC Board inexplicably decided that Mr 
Motsoeneng should be appointed as the permanent COO. This decision 
was accepted by Ms Faith Muthambi, the new Communications Minister, 
who announced his appointment. Both the Board and the Minister acted 
without reference to the OPP's report. As a consequence, the DA applied to 
 
34 SABC v DA para 6. 
35 SABC v DA para 6. 
36 SABC v DA para 6. 
37 SABC v DA para 8. 
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the Western Cape High Court to first suspend Mr Motsoeneng and then to 
set aside his appointment.38 
In opposing the application, the then chairperson of the Board, Ms 
Tshabalala, and Minister Muthambi, denied that the PP's recommendations 
had not been carried out. The Minister stated that soon after receiving the 
PP's report, the Board instructed a firm of attorneys (Mchunu Attorneys) to 
assist it in "investigating the veracity of the findings of the recommendations 
by the Public Protector".39 Mchunu Attorneys duly prepared a report, but Ms 
Tshabalala declined to annex a copy to her affidavit, stating that it was 
privileged.40 
When the matter was heard by the SCA, the court questioned whether the 
Minister had correctly applied her mind in ratifying the decision of the Board 
to appoint Mr Motsoeneng. She would have needed to consider the Mchunu 
Report, the recommendation of the Board and the transcript of Mr 
Motsoeneng's interview, and then weigh those documents against the PP's 
report that ran to 150 pages. Quite implausibly, she claimed to have read, 
analysed and reached conclusions in respect of all the documents within a 
day. In addition, the Minister focussed on only one of several negative 
findings, this being the allegation of dishonesty relating to Mr Motsoeneng's 
matric certificate. She ignored the findings of abuse of power, the wastage 
of public money, the dismissal of senior staff and the shortcomings in 
corporate governance. She further ignored the failure of the Board to 
advertise the post, consider other candidates, or hold interviews prior to 
interviewing Mr Motsoeneng. 
 
The report of the OPP required the Board and the Minister to submit an 
implementation plan, which they had failed to do. In the circumstances the 
PP was obliged to raise the issues in court. According to her, Mr Yunus 
Carim, Ms Muthambi's predecessor, undertook in Parliament to implement 
the remedial action, but this was not carried out. In addition, the Board 
sought extensions from the PP but failed to come up with an implementation 
plan.41 
In the first case heard by the Western Cape High Court before Schippers J, 
the notice of motion filed by the DA was in two parts.42 Part A was an urgent 
 
38 SABC v DA para 9. 
39 SABC v DA para 14. 
40 SABC v DA para 15. 
41 SABC v DA para 18. 
42 Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited 2015 1 SA 
551 (WCC) (hereafter DA v SABC (2015)). 
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application filed by the DA that sought an order suspending Mr Motsoeneng 
from his position as the COO of the SABC, pending the finalisation of 
disciplinary proceedings to be brought against him by the Board and the 
determination of the relief sought in Part B of the notice of motion. In Part 
A, the DA also sought an order directing the Board to begin disciplinary 
proceedings against Mr Motsoeneng within five days of the date of the 
court's order. It also sought an order directing the Board to appoint someone 
as acting COO to fill Mr Motsoeneng's position, pending the appointment of 
a suitably qualified permanent COO.43 
Schippers J noted that the PP had commented that the issue of the nature 
of her powers went beyond the merits of the matter at hand, as it had:44 
… broader and significant implications for the working of our democracy and 
the independence and effectiveness of the institution. 
 
He stated that the principal question before the court was: "[a]re the findings 
of the Public Protector binding and enforceable?"45 He held that the powers 
of the PP are not adjudicative and are far more malleable than the powers 
of the courts.46 This comparison between the powers of the OPP and the 
powers of the courts was subsequently criticised by the Constitutional 
Court.47 
Schippers J went further by stating that the power to make binding decisions 
is:48 
… considered antithetical to the institution – the key technique of the 
ombudsman is one of intellectual authority – making logically consistent and 
defensible findings – and powers of persuasion. 
 
A contrast was made with the CCMA, which has clearly been given the 
power to make final, binding and enforceable arbitration awards, as if they 
were orders of the Labour Court.49 
The court concluded that the findings of the PP are not binding and 
enforceable. However, the decision of an organ of state to reject such 
 
 
 
43 DA v SABC (2015) para 1. 
44 DA v SABC (2015) para 45. 
45 SABC v DA para 19. 
46 SABC v DA para 19. 
47 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 3 SA 580 
(CC) (hereafter the EFF case). 
48 DA v SABC (2015) para 57. 
49 Section 143(1) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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findings or remedial action must not be irrational.50 A decision by an organ 
of state whether or not to accept the findings of the PP constitutes the 
exercise of public power. Rationality is a minimum threshold requirement 
applicable to the exercise of such power by all organs of state.51 It is a 
requirement of the principle of legality that decisions be rationally related to 
the purpose for which the power was given.52 
Schippers J ruled that there were no grounds, rational or otherwise, for the 
Board to reject the OPP's findings and remedial action.53 He issued an order 
directing the Board to commence disciplinary charges against Mr 
Motsoeneng, on account of his alleged dishonesty relating to the 
misrepresentation of his qualifications, abuse of power, and improper 
conduct. The court further held that an independent person should preside 
over the disciplinary proceedings. Pending the completion of the disciplinary 
proceedings, Mr Motsoeneng was to be suspended on full pay.54 
The SABC, the Minister of Communications and Mr Motsoeneng took the 
issue of the latter's suspension on appeal to the SCA. The conclusion 
reached by the court that the findings by the OPP may be binding, 
depending on the context and circumstances, marks an important shift 
regarding the nature of the powers of this office. In their judgment, Navsa 
and Ponnan JJA emphasised the importance of section 41 of the 
Constitution, which provides that all spheres of government and all organs 
of state must co-operate with one another and assist and support one 
another.55 The main issue addressed in this case was the nature and extent 
of the PP's powers. In addressing these the court examined the:56 
… constitutional and legislative architecture to determine how State 
institutions and officials are required to deal with remedial action taken by the 
Public Protector. 
 
The SCA differed from the court a quo on the issue of the OPP's powers. 
The court noted that Chapter 9 institutions were established as independent 
watchdogs to strengthen South Africa's constitutional democracy.57 This 
 
 
50 SABC v DA para 20. 
51 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) para 90 (hereafter the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers case). 
52 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers case para 85. 
53 DA v SABC (2015) para 78. 
54 SABC v DA para 21. 
55 SABC v DA para 2. 
56 SABC v DA para 3. 
57 SABC v DA para 23. 
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independent status means they are not "functionally interdependent and 
interrelated in relation to all other spheres of government".58 Furthermore, 
these institutions are not organs of state even though they perform their 
functions in terms of national legislation, are not subject to executive control, 
and should be seen to be outside government.59 
The powers of the OPP in terms of s 182(1)(c) of the Constitution far exceed 
those in comparable jurisdictions.60 The court further commented that the 
Constitution sets high standards for government officials and when their 
conduct is found wanting by the OPP, on the whole they are not likely to   
"… meekly accept her findings and implement her remedial measures. 
That is not how guilty bureaucrats in society generally respond".61 
The SCA held that a court is an inaccurate comparator to the OPP. The 
SCA pointed out that as a consequence of the Oudekraal principle a 
decision set aside by a court "exists in fact and has legal consequences that 
cannot simply be overlooked".62 The court in SABC v DA extended the 
Oudekraal principle to apply it to decisions taken by the OPP based on the 
PP's unique position in South Africa's constitutional order. It therefore 
concluded that Oudekraal applies with "even greater force to the decisions 
finally arrived at" by the OPP. The rationale for the court’s extending the 
principle beyond the context of administrative law is that the premise 
underpinning the principle, namely that the "proper functioning of a modern 
State would be considerably compromised if an administrative act could be 
given effect to or ignored depending upon the view the subject takes of the 
validity of the act in question", would apply with equal force to the OPP.63 
Recently, the incumbent PP, Advocate Mkhwebane, suggested that the 
OPP should be afforded a similar status as that of a court. For reasons 
stated later in the article, decisions made by the PP cannot be classified as 
administrative action as the OPP is not part of the bureaucracy. As the OPP 
plays an investigative and adjudicative role, it performs functions that are 
materially and constitutionally different from those performed in a court of 
law. In terms of the separation of powers doctrine, officers performing 
investigative functions cannot simultaneously be classified as court 
 
58 SABC v DA para 24. The Court quoted with approval dicta from the CC in IEC v 
Langerberg Municipality 2001 3 SA 925 (CC) para 27, which emphasised that 
Chapter 9 institutions are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the 
law. 
59 SABC v DA para 25. 
60 SABC v DA para 43. 
61 SABC v DA para 44. 
62 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 26. 
63 SABC v DA para 45. 
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officials.64 It would appear that some Chapter 9 institutions that are 
empowered to take decisions straddle the continuum between the 
bureaucracy and the judiciary. The OPP, like the SAHRC, is a structure of 
government.65 Neither body, however, are members of the bureaucracy, nor 
can they be described as courts. At the same time, the OPP can make 
binding, legal, decisions. It is well settled in law that until a decision is set 
aside in court proceedings for judicial review, it exists in fact and has 
attendant legal consequences that cannot be ignored. The SCA went further 
by ruling that the phrase "binding and enforceable" used in the lower court 
was confusing.66 
The court stated that the OPP was obviously better suited to determine 
alleged misconduct within the SABC than the SABC itself. The OPP had 
conducted a full investigation before publishing its findings, and unless the 
SABC had taken the matter on review, it was obliged to implement the 
findings and remedial measures.67 The Minister and the Board insisted that 
they were intent on engaging with the OPP regarding the report. However, 
the court commented that once the OPP had finally spoken, following a full 
investigation, having afforded all parties a proper hearing, there should have 
been compliance. It was clear that the SABC and the Minister had adopted 
an "intransigent approach".68 
The SCA further held that the OPP would not be able to achieve the 
constitutional purpose of its office if other organs of state could ignore its 
recommendations. The language, history and purpose of section 182(1)(c) 
clearly provided that the Constitution empowered the OPP to provide 
effective remedies for misconduct.69 The court described the OPP as a 
"venerable" institution.70 An institution or person might challenge a finding 
by the OPP by way of a review application. In the absence of such an 
application, however, an institution or person could not simply ignore the 
findings, decisions or remedial action given by the OPP.71 
In addition ⎯ as highlighted in SABC v DA ⎯ a state body could not set up 
 
64 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 833 (CC); 
Sibanda 2019 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-08-07-the-public- 
protectors-call-to-be-accorded-the-status-of-a-judge-is-nonsensical-to-a-certain- 
degree/. 
65 Klaaren 1997 SAJHR 7. 
66 SABC v DA para 45. 
67 SABC v DA para 47. 
68 SABC v DA para 48. 
69 SABC v DA para 52. 
70 SABC v DA para 53. 
71 SABC v DA para 53. 
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an investigation process parallel to that of the OPP. The SCA further stated 
that the view of the court a quo that the OPP exercised a mere power of 
recommendation was incorrect. This conclusion was more consistent with 
the spirit of the Interim Constitution and was "neither fitting nor effective".72 
The effect of the High Court's judgment was that, if the state body simply 
ignored the OPP's remedial measures, the onus would be on a private 
litigant or the OPP to institute court proceedings to demonstrate the veracity 
of its findings.73 
 
By declining to give effect to the OPP's report the Minister and the SABC 
Board:74 
… misconceived the import of the Public Protector's powers and acted 
irrationally in their response to it. 
 
The case was therefore one of both the Minister and the Board failing to 
understand the effect of the OPP's findings, as well as failing in their duty to 
the SABC and the public at large.75 
As a consequence of this judgment, the OPP's powers to curb 
maladministration and secure effective remedial action were significantly 
enhanced. 
 
The SABC, the Minister and Mr Motsoeneng were denied leave to appeal 
the judgment by both the SCA and the Constitutional Court.76 The DA then 
sought an order in relation to Part B of the original notice of motion from the 
Western Cape High Court, in terms of which the decisions of the Board and 
the Minister to recommend Mr Motsoeneng to the position of COO be set 
aside. It further requested that the Board recommend a new COO.77 
Ultimately Davis J set aside the decision of the Minister to approve the 
recommendation of the Board to appoint Mr Motsoeneng to the permanent 
position of COO of the SABC.78 
 
Davis J refused leave to appeal to the SCA, and the latter court dismissed 
a petition in September 2016. Following this, the DA finally approached 
the High Court, seeking a number of orders. These included an order 
declaring 
 
72 SABC v DA para 53. 
73 SABC v DA para 53. 
74 SABC v DA para 60. 
75 SABC v DA para 60. 
76 SABC v DA para 29 
77 Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited 2016 3 SA 
468 (WCC) para 18 (hereafter DA v SABC (2016)). 
78 DA v SABC (2016) para 55. 
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that the SABC and its Board had failed to respect and implement the 
findings and remedial action of the PP, and an order declaring that they had 
failed to comply with and were in contempt of the Part A order as confirmed 
by the SCA.79 Rogers J looked at the question of whether it was only the 
PP's remedial action that was binding, or also her findings of fact. He 
concluded that apart from failing to comply with her remedial action, the 
SABC had also acted in a manner inconsistent with her factual findings. As 
a consequence, the DA was entitled to the declarations it sought.80 
 
This convoluted and protracted litigation demonstrates how difficult it is to 
enforce the remedial measures of the OPP if there is a perception that these 
are purely recommendatory. It is apparent from a conspectus of all the 
judgments in this saga that there was no rational basis for not abiding by 
the remedial measures required by the OPP. Now that the powers of the 
OPP have been clarified in the SCA judgment, the options facing organs of 
state are now much clearer. They must either review the decision or adhere 
to the remedial action of the OPP. Placing the onus on the organ of state to 
either review or abide by the decision of the OPP will certainly obviate the 
need to engage in protracted and costly litigation by persons who have 
secured redress from the OPP. However, the impact of the judgment on the 
ability of the OPP to carry out its mediatory functions remains unclear. The 
unique role played by the OPP in South Africa's constitutional democracy 
and the specific need for flexibility was one of the reasons behind the 
reasoning in Schippers J's judgment. 
 
3 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National 
Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National 
Assembly 
The SABC report by the OPP was followed by the "Secure in Comfort" report 
dealing with the Nkandla scandal. The latter ignited a greater measure of 
public controversy than the highly controversial SABC Report, because it 
found that the President had unjustifiably benefitted from the security 
upgrades to his home in Nkandla. This unleashed a firestorm, which 
culminated in the Constitutional Court’s finding that the President, by failing 
 
79 Democratic Alliance v South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited; Democratic 
Alliance v Motsoeneng 2017 2 BLLR 153 (WCC) paras 45-46 (hereafter DA v SABC 
(2017)). 
80 DA v SABC (2017) paras 195-196. The mismanagement prevalent under Mr 
Motsoeneng at the SABC was subsequently laid bare before the nation when the 
parliamentary ad hoc committee heard witnesses and evidence into the fitness of 
the SABC Board. Its final report is a damning indictment of the Board, the Minister, 
and also Mr Motsoeneng. 
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to implement the remedial action of the OPP, had acted in violation of 
section 83(b) read with sections 182(1)(c) and 181(3)81 of the Constitution.82 
Section 83(b) obliges the President to uphold, defend and respect the 
Constitution. 
 
The OPP investigated allegations of improper conduct or irregular 
expenditure concerning the security upgrades at the private residence of 
the then President, in Nkandla. It concluded that Mr Zuma had failed to act 
in accordance with his constitutional and ethical obligations, as he had 
knowingly benefitted from the irregular allocation of state resources. 
Accordingly, the OPP directed Mr Zuma to pay a portion proportionate to 
the undue benefit that had accrued to him. In addition, the PP directed Mr 
Zuma to reprimand various Ministers involved in the security upgrades at 
Nkandla.83 The OPP's report was submitted to the Presidency and to the 
National Assembly. For over a year, neither body fulfilled its obligations in 
terms of the prescribed remedial action, which prompted the court 
applications by the EFF and DA.84 
In the EFF case Mogoeng CJ noted that taking remedial action under the 
Final Constitution was more far-reaching than merely addressing 
complaints, as was the case under the Interim Constitution.85 It involved 
setting out a proper and comprehensive remedy by the OPP, which was 
constitutionally empowered to do so. For it to be effective, the remedy often 
had to be binding.86 The Constitutional Court in EFF endorsed the 
sentiments of the SCA in SABC v DA in the following terms:87 
[t]he Public Protector cannot realise the constitutional purpose of her office if 
other organs of State may second-guess her findings and ignore her 
recommendations. 
 
The court held that the language, history and purpose of section 182(1)(c) 
made it clear that the Constitution intended for the OPP to have the power 
to provide an effective remedy for state misconduct, which included the 
 
 
 
81 Section 181(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 (the 
Constitution) obliges "other organs of state … to assist and protect these institutions 
to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these 
institutions". 
82 EFF case para 105. 
83 EFF case para 2. 
84 EFF case para 3. 
85 Section 112(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
86 EFF case para 68. 
87 SABC v DA para 31. 
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power to determine the remedy and to direct its implementation.88 
 
What legal effect the remedial action had in a particular case depended on 
the nature of the matters in question. In certain circumstances, negotiation, 
conciliation and mediation would be the most appropriate routes to be taken 
by the OPP.89 Crucially, however, Mogoeng CJ held that it was inconsistent 
with the context, purpose and language of sections 181 and 182 of the 
Constitution, and concluded that the OPP was empowered only to make 
recommendations that might be disregarded, provided there was a rational 
basis for doing so. In doing so, he rejected the test formulated by Schippers 
J. 
 
A perusal of the powers of the OPP, particularly those contained in section 
6 of the Act, clearly indicate that a variety of options are available to the PP 
depending on the circumstances of the case. The "softer" options of 
mediation, negotiation and conciliation or providing advice may at times be 
the most prudent courses of action to follow. If these routes are deemed 
appropriate by the PP, then those to whom the measures are directed are 
legally obliged to consider them properly and in determining which course 
to follow are to have regard to their nature, context and language.90 This is 
important because it signals the importance of mediation, conciliation and 
providing advice in the resolution of complaints, which are not undermined 
by the EEF case. 
 
However, the subject matter of the investigation and the type of findings that 
are made to ensure effective remedial action may require that the OPP 
determine the appropriate remedy and direct its implementation. Once this 
is done, compliance is no longer optional. According to Mogoeng CJ, the 
OPP's power to take remedial action is "not inflexible in its application, but 
situational", and is "wide but certainly not unfettered". 91 Mogoeng CJ listed 
eight points as being of "cardinal significance" regarding the nature, 
exercise and legal effect of the remedial power.92 First, he stated that the 
primary source of the power to take appropriate remedial action was the 
Constitution, with the Public Protector Act being a secondary source. 
Second, such power was exercisable only against those that the OPP is 
constitutionally and statutorily empowered to investigate. Third, it was 
implicit in the words "take action" that the OPP was empowered to decide 
 
88 SABC v DA para 52. 
89 EFF case para 69. 
90 . EFF case para 69 
91 EFF case para 71. 
92 EFF case para 71. 
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on and determine the appropriate remedial measure. Fourth, the OPP had 
the power to determine the appropriate remedy and to prescribe the manner 
of its implementation. Fifth, the word "appropriate" meant nothing less than 
effective, suitable, proper or fitting to redress or undo the prejudice, 
impropriety, unlawful enrichment or corruption in a particular case. Sixth, 
only when it was appropriate and practicable to effectively remedy or undo 
the complaint would a legally binding remedial action be taken. Seventh, it 
was necessary to determine, given the subject matter of the investigation, 
whether the remedial measure had to be binding to provide appropriate 
redress, or whether a non-binding measure would suffice. Finally, whether 
a remedial measure was binding or not was a matter of interpretation aided 
by its context, nature and language.93 
These criteria provided the guidelines to assist in determining whether to 
follow a route that could result in binding remedial action or alternatively 
determine a process that could yield pure recommendations. Importantly, 
these criteria structured the discretion of the OPP, and had to be considered 
prior to a decision’s being made on the appropriate remedial action in a 
particular case. It might be advisable for the PP, after accepting the 
complaint, to decide at the outset whether the final remedial measure should 
be binding or recommendatory. This preliminary decision would determine 
the procedure to be followed when investigating, assessing and where 
appropriate suggesting remedial action in a particular case. It was important 
that decisions that were binding were preceded by a fair process and 
conducted by an impartial arbiter. It was apparent from the list of criteria that 
for decisions to be binding, the OPP had to act within its mandate and only 
against persons and entities over which it had jurisdiction. If the OPP was 
of the view that a non-binding recommendation would suffice, then that 
option should be employed. Ultimately, whether a remedial measure was 
binding or not would be a matter of interpretation determined by its context, 
nature and language. It would therefore be most prudent that remedial 
measures directed by the OPP demonstrate that these criteria have been 
considered and applied. It might be advisable for rules of practice to be 
developed by the OPP to regulate its internal procedures so as to ensure 
that processes that lead to recommendations are distinct from processes 
that lead to binding remedial actions. 
 
The reasoning in the SABC v DA and EFF cases has had a major impact 
on South African society, culminating in the Zondo Commission of Inquiry 
into state capture. Shocking evidence of high-level corruption involving 
 
93 EFF case para 71. 
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parliamentarians, members of the executive and senior public officials has 
been led at the inquiry chaired by Zondo DCJ. Evidence that members of 
the Gupta family offered cabinet positions to individuals suggests that the 
state was compromised at the highest level. 
 
4 President of the Republic of South Africa v Office of the 
Public Protector ("state capture case") 
Arguably the most consequential and far-reaching report of the OPP was 
the "State of Capture" report. Ultimately, the conclusion was that there was 
prima facie evidence of state capture in South Africa. The OPP implicated 
the President by making serious prima facie findings against him and 
various other entities and private individuals. Robust attempts were made 
by the Presidency to set aside the report by the OPP. 
 
This case concerned the remedial action contained in the OPP's Report No 
6 of 2016/17 entitled "State of Capture" (the Report), which was reviewed 
by the President before a full bench of the Pretoria High Court. The report 
contained details of an investigation carried out by the OPP into alleged 
improper conduct by the President, certain government officials and the 
Gupta family. In particular, this conduct concerned the appointment of 
cabinet ministers and directors of state-owned entities, which possibly 
resulted in the award of government contracts and other benefits to the 
Gupta family. The remedial action directed the President to appoint a 
commission of inquiry to investigate the events described in the report.94 
Quoting EFF, Mlambo J emphasised that the OPP's powers to take 
appropriate remedial action, while wide, were not unfettered. Importantly, 
such remedial action was always subject to judicial scrutiny.95 He referred 
to EFF, where the Constitutional Court had held that the remedial action of 
the OPP was "context-specific" and was not "inflexible in its application, but 
situational".96 Determining what remedial action was appropriate in a 
particular case depended on the nature of the issues and the findings 
made.97 
Mlambo J further adopted a purposive interpretation of the relevant statutes 
and concluded that the OPP must have power, in certain circumstances, to 
 
 
94 President of the Republic of South Africa v Office of the Public Protector 2018 2 SA 
100 (GP) para 2 (hereafter the President case). 
95 President case para 84. 
96 EFF case para 71. 
97 President case para 84. 
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direct the President to appoint a commission of inquiry. In addition, the OPP 
should be able to direct the manner of the commission's implementation. 
This would allow the OPP to properly fulfil her constitutional mandate. He 
added that a contrary interpretation would not only be inconsistent with the 
Constitution, but would "render the Public Protector's power to take remedial 
action largely meaningless or ineffectual".98 
The President argued that only the President was empowered in terms of 
section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution to appoint a commission of inquiry. The 
issue was whether this constitutional power could be limited by the remedial 
action directed to be taken by the PP. The court emphasised that the 
exercise of public power, including the exercise of executive power, had to 
be in accordance with the constraints of the Constitution and the principle 
of legality. The role of the OPP was to protect the public from the wrongful 
and improper exercise of public power and to provide effective remedial 
action. This would require the PP in appropriate cases to direct members of 
the executive on how to exercise their discretionary powers. The court 
concluded, having regard to the statutory framework, that the PP, in order 
to carry out her constitutional and statutory duties, had to have the power in 
appropriate circumstances to direct that the President hold a commission of 
inquiry and to direct the manner of its implementation.99 As a consequence, 
the Presidency's main ground of review ⎯ that it was unlawful for the OPP 
to instruct the President to appoint a commission of inquiry regardless of the 
circumstances ⎯ was rejected by the court.100 Taking into consideration the 
financial and other constraints contained in the Report, the OPP considered 
it appropriate that the second phase of the investigation be conducted by a 
commission of inquiry.101 Mlambo J held that the OPP was not prohibited by 
statute from instructing another organ of state to conduct a further 
investigation.102 In fact, the Public Protector Act contemplated that the OPP 
would exercise its powers with the assistance of other state bodies. In 
particular, the PP could require other parties to "make appropriate 
recommendations" following the conclusion of an investigation.103 
Section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution required the OPP to "take appropriate 
remedial action".104 This meant action that provided a "proper, fitting, 
 
 
98 President case para 85. 
99 . President case para 82. 
100 President case para 86. 
101 President case para 90. 
102 President case para 91. 
103 President case para 94. 
104 President case para 114. 
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suitable and effective remedy for whatever complaint and against 
whomsoever the Public Protector [was] called upon to investigate".105 The 
court ruled that there was compelling prima facie evidence that the 
relationship between the President and the Gupta family amounted to "state 
capture". This was most clearly seen by the power of the Guptas to influence 
the appointment of cabinet ministers and directors of state-owned 
enterprises. They were able to use this power to gain preferential treatment 
in obtaining state contracts, gaining access to state-provided business 
finance, and also the award of business licences.106 
In order to decide whether the OPP's remedial action was lawful and 
rational, the court looked at the role played by a commission of inquiry as 
well as how it performed that role, and why it was better suited than the OPP 
to accomplish certain ends.107 The court ruled that the President's 
insistence that he should be solely responsible for selecting the judge to 
head the commission was not in accordance with the legal principle of 
recusal.108 The President further argued that it was beyond the powers of 
the OPP to give directions concerning the manner in which the commission 
of inquiry would operate.109 The court held, however, that the OPP had the 
power to give directions as to the manner of the implementation of the 
commission of inquiry.110 
 
Among the reasons given by the OPP for instructing the President to 
establish a commission were that she lacked adequate resources, the 
investigation was not complete and her term was coming to an end, and she 
also had concerns about the qualifications and experience of her 
successor.111 The President argued that these reasons were irrational and 
did not provide a lawful and proper basis for the OPP's remedial action.112 
The court, however, determined that the three reasons given by the OPP 
satisfied the rationality test, in that they were rationally related to the 
objective sought to be achieved.113 
Thus, in summary, Schippers J in DA v SABC concluded that the findings 
of the OPP were not binding and enforceable – but that the decision to 
 
 
105 President case para 115. 
106 President case para 128. 
107 President case para 130. 
108 President case para 144. 
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ignore them was not rational. On appeal to the SCA, Navsa and Ponnan 
JJA criticised the judgment of the court a quo. First, they stated that that the 
OPP cannot achieve the constitutional purpose of its office if other organs 
of state can ignore its recommendations. The court also held that a court is 
a misleading comparator when determining the effect of the PP's powers. 
In EFF Mogoeng CJ ruled that the Constitution intends for the PP to provide 
an effective remedy for misconduct on the part of the state, and that this 
includes the power to determine the remedy. Mogoeng CJ agreed with the 
SCA's judgment but delimited the PP's powers by emphasising that they are 
"situational"; in other words, the legal effect of the PP's remedial action 
depends on the nature of the matter. Most recently Mlambo J developed 
this idea in President v Office of the Public Protector by concluding that the 
factors relied on by the OPP were rationally related to the objective sought 
to be achieved. It is obvious that these judgments were in part dictated by 
the context and by the cynical attempts to ostensibly comply with the 
findings of the OPP. Public funds and dubious legal stratagems were used 
in protracted litigation to avoid meaningful compliance with the findings of 
the OPP. The true purpose of this strategy appeared to be to prevent 
specific persons who had acted unlawfully from being held accountable and 
answerable. Importantly, there was a pattern of behaviour of this nature. If 
this pattern of behaviour had gone unchecked, it would have fundamentally 
eroded the rule of law and undermined the efficacy of the OPP and other 
Chapter 9 institutions. It is also apparent that the various courts had the 
common purpose of ensuring that findings of the OPP could not be 
disdainfully ignored. The difficulty was to achieve this in a manner that was 
consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligation of the OPP and in 
accordance with the doctrine of the separation of powers. Finding that the 
OPP had the power to make binding decisions was a step too far for 
Schippers J in DA v SABC, but not so for the SCA and the Constitutional 
Court. Given the fact that these decisions have implications that go beyond 
the OPP and given the extensive constitutional mandate of the SAHRC, it 
was considered appropriate to reflect on the impact on it of these judgments. 
 
5 The South African Human Rights Commission 
 
In the last part of the article the question of whether or not the findings in 
the EFF and SABC v DA cases can be extended to other Chapter 9 
institutions is assessed. Both cases concluded that the decision of the OPP 
may, in certain situations, have a binding effect. The issue is whether this 
conclusion can be extended to the South African Human Rights 
Commission (SAHRC). The six institutions established under Chapter 9 are 
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discrete and have separate functions. Even so, their grouping under 
Chapter 9 is not unintended and they all have two common functions: 
checking government and promoting social justice.114 The SAHRC is 
included because of the similarities between it and the OPP, from a 
constitutional perspective. A close reading of the institutions grouped 
together under Chapter 9 of the Constitution and assigned the critical 
responsibility of supporting constitutional democracy indicates the existence 
of a constitutional hierarchy of institutions. It appears that the OPP, the first 
of the institutions mentioned in Chapter 9, is afforded an elevated status. 
Section 193(5) of the Constitution requires that the National Assembly 
approve a resolution with a supporting vote of at least 60 per cent 
nominating a person to the post of PP. The PP can constitutionally be 
removed from office only if a resolution is adopted to that effect by at least 
two thirds of the members of the National Assembly (NA).115 The same 
appointment and removal procedures apply to the Auditor-General. The 
Constitution requires that the nomination of other commissioners be 
approved by a bare majority of the members of the NA, and similarly their 
removal can be effected by a resolution supported by a majority of the 
members of the NA.116 Thus the appointment and removal of the PP can be 
effected by a heightened majority only, which is not so for the other 
commissioners. The heighted majority for the appointment and removal of 
the PP suggests a constitutional hierarchy among Chapter 9 institutions. 
A material distinction is drawn, however, between the OPP and the SAHRC 
on the one hand and the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities (CLR 
Commission) and the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE) on the other. 
Neither the CLR Commission nor the CGE have the constitutional authority 
to secure appropriate redress after making findings. The CGE Act 
empowers it to negotiate and mediate issues and then enables it to refer the 
matter to the SAHRC, the PP or any other authority.117 It appears that in this 
important respect the constitutional mandates of the CLR and CGE 
Commissions are materially different from those of the OPP and the 
SAHRC. 
 
For the reasons that follow, it is submitted that findings of the SAHRC may, 
in certain situations, also have a binding effect, and that the conclusion in 
the EFF case can be extended to the SAHRC. If the conclusion in EFF 
 
114 Murray 2006 PELJ 26. 
115 Section 194(4) of the Constitution. 
116 Section 193(5)(b)(ii), read with s194(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
117 Section 11(1)(e) of the Commission for Gender Equality Act 39 of 1996. 
K GOVENDER & P SWANEPOEL PER / PELJ 2020 (23) 25 
 
 
 
 
rested solely on an analysis and application of section 182 of the 
Constitution, then an argument could have been made that the judgment 
was restricted in scope to the mandate of the OPP. However, it is clear that 
the conclusion and findings of the OPP may, in certain circumstances, be 
binding and rest on several premises, including section 181, section 182, a 
purposive analysis of the role of the OPP in South Africa's constitutional 
democracy, and the principles of the rule of law. Resting the conclusion on 
a much broader foundation than section 182 enables the argument that 
much of the rationale for the conclusion will apply with equal force to the 
SAHRC. 
 
Both the OPP and the SAHRC have, within their spheres of competence, 
the power to investigate an issue and report on their findings, and then in 
the instance of the OPP, to "take appropriate remedial action", and, in the 
case of the SAHRC, "to take steps to secure appropriate redress where 
human rights have been violated". 118 It is the manner in which the power of 
the SAHRC to take remedial steps is couched that may lend credence to 
the contention that it would have to take a further step such as approaching 
a court of law to secure appropriate redress for a person whose human 
rights have been violated. Section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution 
unequivocally empowers the OPP to "take appropriate remedial action". 
However, it is material that the Constitution requires both the redress of the 
SAHRC and the remedial action of the OPP to be "appropriate". It therefore 
must follow that if the redress or the remedial action taken by the SAHRC 
and the OPP is not appropriate, then these institutions would be falling short 
of their constitutional responsibilities. 
 
"Appropriate" was defined in the EFF case as "effective, suitable, proper or 
fitting to redress the transgression".119 If the decisions of the SAHRC would 
be deemed to be purely recommendatory in all instances, then it is unlikely 
to meet the constitutional standard of providing appropriate relief, as it would 
not be providing effective, suitable, proper or fitting redress. The court in 
EFF reaffirmed the principle that without an effective remedy the values 
underpinning a right would be undermined. If the SAHRC is unable to 
secure appropriate redress for violations of human rights, then one of the 
primary objectives of protecting human rights would be undermined. Thus, 
the investigation, the reporting and the taking of steps to secure appropriate 
 
 
 
 
118 Section 182 read with s 184 of Constitution. 
119 EFF case para 71. 
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redress must be seen as component parts of one endeavour, which is the 
protection of human rights. 
 
As stated earlier, the court in EFF emphasised the significance of section 
181 of the Constitution to its determination. This section applies to all the 
Chapter 9 institutions, and was described as a reliable pointer in answering 
the question of whether the OPP can make binding decisions.120 
Significantly, the court in EFF121 pointed out that the imperative in section 
181 that the institutions be independent, that they be impartial, and that they 
exercise their powers without fear, favour or prejudice is incongruent with 
the notion that the implementation of the decision is at the mercy of the 
person against whom the decision is made. The insistence that the 
institutions be independent and impartial suggests that they must have the 
power to make decisions that have consequences and must be abided by. 
The court posed the rhetorical question – why from a common-sense 
perspective would institutions be entrenched in the Constitution, provided 
with funding from the taxpayers, employ staff and have offices throughout 
the country, and then be able to make only inconsequential decisions? 
Finally, institutions that have the ability to make decisions that have 
consequences are more likely to support democracy than those that do not. 
The contents of section 181 point strongly in the direction that, in some 
instances, the institutions listed can make binding decisions. 
 
The SAHRC is no different from the OPP in that it is also meant to represent 
and protect the most marginalised in society against those that are better 
resourced and more powerful. President Zuma's obdurate refusal to 
implement the findings in the Nkandla and State of Capture reports pitted 
the OPP against the highest ranking public official in the country. These 
were most unusual circumstances. However, a finding by the SAHRC that 
the MEC for Health in KwaZulu-Natal violated the human rights of cancer 
patients should also be unpalatable, disconcerting and condemnatory of the 
individual and department concerned.122 Requiring them, at their discretion, 
to implement the remedial measures would not amount to appropriate 
redress. The more drastic the findings and the more far-reaching the 
remedial measures, the less likely that the persons affected will implement 
them. The temptation of the powerful to resist implementing decisions, if 
they are afforded a discretion, and the consequences of doing so apply with 
equal veracity to both the OPP and SAHRC. 
 
 
120 EFF case para 66. 
121 EFF case para 49. 
122 SAHRC Final Investigative Report. 
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Section 181 of the Constitution points quite strongly in the direction that the 
decisions and the appropriate redress should in certain circumstances be 
binding. It is an established principle of constitutional interpretation that 
various constitutional provisions should be interpreted consistently with one 
another. It would be incongruent for a section to be afforded a particular 
interpretation and another section of the text to be afforded a contradictory 
meaning.123 Thus, the mandate of the SAHRC to "take steps to secure 
appropriate redress where human rights have been violated" must be 
interpreted to the extent reasonably possible in a manner that is consistent 
with section 181.124 Given the breadth of the SAHRC mandate, it may in 
some instances be required to come up with redress that requires 
interactions with institutions and organs of state that were not parties to the 
complaint. In instances of the systemic violations of human rights, it may 
have to determine measures that require co-operation from and 
engagement with other institutions of state, and that may require further 
mediation and negotiation. The wording of section 184(2)(b) was probably 
designed to give the SAHRC the flexibility to engage others to ensure 
adequate implementation, and also to make binding decisions in other 
circumstances. The difference in wording between section 184(2)(b) and 
section 182(1)(c), in the light of these considerations, is not sufficient to 
support the conclusion that the SAHRC does not have the same mandate 
as the OPP to make binding decisions. 
Those contending that the SAHRC cannot in any circumstances make 
binding decisions will have to deal with the question: "What is the legal 
status of decisions made by the SAHRC when it orders the respondent to 
provide appropriate redress?" If the decision is not binding, then how do you 
prevent respondents from cynically refusing to comply with the directives on 
the basis that they are purely recommendatory? It was this concern that 
prompted the High Court in the first DA v SABC case to find that the 
decisions of the OPP were not binding and enforceable, but that any 
decision not to implement the remedial action must be rational. The court 
appeared to adopt this approach to prevent cynical non-compliance. 
 
The practical difficulties of this approach were exposed in EFF, however, 
because it seemed that a person or organ of state required to take the 
remedial action was vested with the discretion to determine if it was rational 
to ignore the decision. The principled objection was that such an approach 
would be contrary to the rule of law. The court held that a decision that is 
 
123 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 33. 
124 Section 184(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
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grounded in a provision of the Constitution or in any law cannot be ignored 
without a court of law setting aside the decision.125 It quoted with approval 
the comment in Kirland that courts of law and not public officials are arbiters 
of legality.126 The rule of law requires that decisions made by those that 
have legal authority to do so be adhered to or reviewed by a competent 
court. It would be antithetical to the rule of law for a person affected by the 
decision to determine whether and what parts of the decision to respect. 
 
In EFF the court did not discount the possibility that the decision of the OPP 
may amount to administrative action and therefore may be reviewed under 
the PAJA. If the decisions of the OPP were to be classified as administrative 
action, then it would have a binding effect until being set aside by a court of 
law. However, in Minister of Home Affairs v The Public Protector, the SCA 
concluded that the remedial action ordered by the OPP was not subject to 
review in terms of PAJA as it did not amount to administrative action.127 The 
court held that as the OPP exercised both constitutional and public power 
in terms of legislation, it was an organ of state as contemplated in section 
239 (b) of the Constitution.128 The court defined administrative action as 
involving the conduct of the bureaucracy in carrying out the daily functions 
of the state.129 It found that as the OPP is designed to strengthen 
constitutional democracy it does not fit into the category of an institution of 
public administration. It is also designed to be an independent watchdog 
that is answerable to Parliament and not to the executive. Furthermore, 
while it exercises public power it is not a department of state and functions 
separately from the administration of the state. The core function of the OPP 
is to investigate, report on and remedy maladministration, and not to 
administer. Finally, the OPP is given broad discretion to decide as to what 
complainants to accept, how to conduct the investigation and what remedial 
action to order.130 Thus the conclusion reached by the court that the nature, 
functions performed and accountability structures of the OPP are materially 
different from those of an administrative agency. However, the court went 
on to hold that the principle of legality will apply to the review of decisions 
 
 
125 EFF case para 74. 
126 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd 2014 3 SA 481 (CC) 
para 89. 
127 Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of the Republic of South Africa 2018 3 
SA 380 (SCA) (hereafter the Minister of Home Affairs case). 
128 Section 239(b) of the Constitution defines an organ of state as any functionary 
exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a 
functionary exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation, but does not include a court of law. 
129 Minister of Home Affairs case para 38. 
130 Minister of Home Affairs case paras 36-37. 
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of the OPP. It is submitted that a similar reasoning will apply to the review 
of remedial action ordered by the SAHRC. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The judgments discussed in this article expose the attempts to undermine 
constitutional guarantees by organs of state and, by necessary implication, 
acknowledge the determination of the then PP to advance the values of the 
Constitution. There were most decidedly good and bad characters in this 
drama. The broader objective of the article is not just to describe this 
behaviour – but also to ensure that the behaviour found egregiously 
objectionable is not subsequently emulated by others exercising public 
power. 
 
Most of the lead players in the Motsoeneng and Nkandla sagas no longer 
hold public office. Ultimately, and after much stress testing, the system 
worked, mainly due to the existence of an effective OPP, committed 
opposition parties, a free media, dedicated NGOs, and independent and 
impartial courts. The Motsoeneng and Nkandla sagas make out the most 
persuasive case possible for the preservation of the independence and 
effectiveness of these institutions and civil organisations. It is probable that 
the ultimate conclusions in these cases, namely that the decisions of the 
OPP were legally binding, were driven by the lamentable behaviour of the 
public officials involved. Furthermore, these judgments may have important 
consequences for other Chapter 9 institutions, and a material issue is 
whether the ability of the OPP to make binding decisions has implications 
for other such institutions. It is clear that the OPP, like the SAHRC, is not 
part of the bureaucracy and both institutions do not perform the role of a 
court of law. Courts will have the option of either finding that some decisions 
of the SAHRC can be binding and have legal consequences, or that its 
decisions are purely recommendatory. The EFF case makes it most 
improbable that the latter option will be adopted. 
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